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dencies which these practices reveal, or than with the relations they bear to the general character and efficiency of our governmental organization.

As the plan of the bibliography is comprehensive, there are several notable omissions. For example, among special treatises, Grover Cleveland's "Presidential Problems" and Goodnow's "Principles of Administrative Law in the United States" would seem to have deserved a place. Several recent departmental histories, issued from Washington, are omitted. Gaillard Hunt's "Department of State" (1893) is listed, but not his more recent articles on the same subject in the *American Journal of International Law*. The "Register of Debates in Congress" (1824-37) does not appear in the list of documentary materials; and no reference is made to Van Tyne and Leland's "Guide to the Archives of the United States in Washington."

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Hobhouse, L. T. *Social Evolution and Political Theory*. Pp. ix, 218. Price, \$1.50. New York: Columbia University Press, 1911.

What is "progress?" How far has it been realized? What are the prospects? The ultra-biologists are wrong in assuming that evolution is necessarily progress. Ethical values are social, not biological; and the sociologist deals only with "the social fact as distinct from the biological and the psychological." Its vehicle is not heredity but tradition: society's achievements. These are psychological, but not exclusively; nor entirely imitative. "Progress is not racial, but social."

The interest shown in eugenics led the lecturer to give two hours to an expansion of his cautions but not hostile critique. Rational selection of the "best" as the "fit," by segregation, through which there is least net misery, is the logical solution of the dilemma between natural and social evolution. But the premises are doubtful. What is social worth? What defects are biological? The elimination of a bad trait may carry with it several valuable traits. Social worth lies in proportion and blending, more than in "unit characters." Social status indicates inertia or social selection, not necessarily degree of biological fitness or social worth. Society must be perfected before the socially undesirable and the biologically unfit are identical. Biology itself holds variations insignificant in heredity, beside mutations. Biological improvement is subject to social progress, which increasingly preserves valuable mutations, and which will add to our knowledge of which variants should be destroyed.

The fatal treadmill of the Theory of Value is avoided by assuming rather daringly that good is in (1) some kind of life, (2) the fuller the better; (3) some form of happiness; (4) some form of self-realization, and (5) the completely social life—all subsumed in the idea of harmony. This modified organism-concept of society depends on the social evolving of intelligence. The social mind, its highest product, adjusts society to its physical environment. Harmonious social growth, like that of the individual, consists in increased scope, articulateness, unity, and self-conscious direction.

"Mutual interest," or "consciousness of kind," in three phases of kinship, authority and citizenship, is the "descriptive formula" (not "law," though the

distinction seems doubtful) underlying political and other evolution, and leads to the concept of democratic empire. "Citizenship" and "the state" are used only for the third phase. Evolution shows net progress, but no assurance for the future. It is boldly shown that progress has consisted in establishing conditions of self-direction, within limits of our material and purposes; and hope lies in ourselves. "The consciousness of unity profoundly affects the unity itself." The state must increase liberty by adjusting restraints: *laissez faire* was good only against external restraint. Minorities must yield only where uniformity is necessary. The rights of man are based on the common good. Activity which depends for its value on spontaneity should be free; but expediency is the final test.

Such is the argument presented by Prof. Hobhouse, in many features recalling Prof. Ward's and Prof. Giddings' theories. It is odd that the word progress, prominent in the text, does not appear in the rather vague title.

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Holmes, John H. *The Revolutionary Function of the Modern Church.* Pp. xi, 264. Price, \$1.50. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

This "firebrand of his denomination" shows prophetic zeal for social justice, but he is more effective in speech than print. His exclamations, repetitions, and platitudes betoken haste. His sudden drops from impassioned eloquence to the level of the sophomoric outline and the reference library, are disconcertingly like a college debate. Like other "high churchmen," he is quite willing to dogmatize upon the authority of indiscriminate quotations from his own demi-gods.

"The inestimable value of each immortal soul" is "the one great principle which has animated the . . . Church from the beginning" (p. 15), yet "every orthodox scheme of salvation has been founded" upon a "low and repulsive estimate of human nature" (p. 22). He claims that the mediæval church was without social interests! The individual minus his environment "is an abstraction not known to experience" (p. 40), and heredity is dismissed "as only the . . . environment passed along" (p. 225); yet "man is essentially good, not bad" (p. 141); again, "man alone . . . can change the world to suit himself" (p. 59), of course the supreme individual will is "never wholly eliminated" (p. 255), and conditions, due to human greed, are blamed upon "the men who are the creators of the conditions." If crime be socially predetermined, this shifty logic might exonerate employers; or, if the antidote of sin is income, why are the rich the worst true criminals? He praises Jesus' poverty as the condition of his success.

The "inspirational" theory of church activity he thinks "fatal to the social interpretation of religion" (p. 239); but his own theory of "directing" already available energies is hardly distinct from it. For there are many who deny total depravity and "soul rescue," who stop short of wanting all institutions to be "all things to all men." He thinks "what is fitting work for the Christian individual is fitting work for the Christian individuals organized—which means the church," a dangerous generalization.

The last four chapters are excellent. While they might prejudice a careful